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A Question of Intent: The Montana Constitution, Environmental
Rights, and the MEIC Decision
Cameron Carter* and Kyle Karmen**
We the people of Montana grateful to God for the quiet beauty
of our state, the grandeur of our mountains, the vastness of
our rolling plains, and desiring to improve the quality of life,
equality of opportunity and to secure the blessings of liberty
for this and future generations do ordain and establish this
constitution.
Preamble to the Montana Constitution
Our constitution does not require that dead fish float on the
surface of our state's rivers and streams before its farsighted
environmental protections can be invoked.
MEIC v. DEQ
I. INTRODUCTION
Montana's constitution, adopted m 1972, grants the citizens of Mon-
tana certain environmental rights. Court decisions prior to 1999 referenced
the environmental provisions in various contexts, but no opimon had inter-
preted and applied the provisions.' What the environmental rights provi-
sions in the constitution actually meant beyond lofty statements of conser-
vation philosophy remained an open question until 1999
In October of 1999, the Montana Supreme Court decided Montana En-
vironmental Information Center v. Department of Environmental Quality 2
The decision addressed whether a statutory exemption from degradation re-
view for water well or momtoring well tests3 violated the right to a clean
and healthful environment expressed m Article II, Section 3, and protected
in Article IX, Section 1, subsections (1) and (3) of the Montana Constitu-
tion. Justice Trieweiler, writing for the court,4 addressed three issues: 1)
* J.D. expected 2002 Umversity of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Mont.
** J.D. expected 2002 Umversity of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Mont.
1. See Mont. Const. art. II, § 3, art. IX, § 1. State District Court Judge Honzel, referrng to the
right to a clean and healthful environment contained in Article II, section 1 of the Montana Constitution,
stated: "The constitutional provisions at issue here are not merely advisory. They mean something."
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Montana Dep't of State Lands, No. CDV-92-486 (D. Mont. May 28, 1993).
Unfortunately, Judge Honzel never elaborated on tlus statement.
2. Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999) [herein-
after MEIC].
3. The exemption passed by the 1995 state legislature and codified in section 75-5-317(2)G) of the
Montana Code Annotated exempted discharges from water well or monitoring well tests from degrada-
tion review, pursuant to Montana's water nondegradation policies- specifically, MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 75-5-303(3) (1995).
4. Justices Leaphart and Gray filed special concurrences.
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did the environmental groups suing have standing to challenge the exemp-
tion;5 2) what level of scrutiny applies to each of the constitutional provi-
sions;' and 3) what threshold showing of harm implicates the rights con-
tained in Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1.
MEIC is the first decision by the Montana Supreme Court to delineate
the nature and scope of the environmental provisions contained in Mon-
tana's Constitution. Significantly, it sets out: 1) the legal standards for
standing to challenge alleged violations of constitutional environmental
provisions; and 2) the level of judicial scrutiny applied to alleged violations
of those environmental provisions. More interesting, however, is the
court's holding that Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1 are inter-
related and interdependent provisions, to be scrutinized consistently
Section II of this note examines the factual and procedural background
of MEIC Section III discusses the court's reasoning and holding on the
three issues presented for review Section IV highlights the controversial
aspects of the decision. Section V explains the disposition of the case and
the subsequent proceedings. Section VI assesses the decision's impact,
concluding the court's decision on standing is a victory for groups or indi-
viduals seeking to bnng challenges based on the environmental provisions
of the Montana Constitution even if the abbreviated reasoning and analysis
make it difficult to draw any broad conclusions as to the decision's legacy
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In 1992, a company known as Seven-Up Pete Joint Venture (SPJV)
applied for a mineral exploration license pursuant to its plan to construct the
McDonald Gold Mine Project, a large open pit gold mine in the upper
Blackfoot River valley near the confluence of the Landers Fork and Black-
foot Rivers.' The Montana Department of Environmental Quality (the
"Agency") granted the permit. 9 Construction of the mine required ground-
water levels at the site to be lowered by a system of wells and pumps, to
provide water for mining operations and prevent flooding of the mine
works. 1° On June 2, 1995, SPJV submitted a revision of its work plan to
the Agency, seeking approval for extended pumping of groundwater from
5. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1242.
6. Id. at 1244.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1237-38.
9. Id. at 1238.
10. Id. at 1239.
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the bedrock aquifer underlying the mine site." SPJV drilled three test
wells to provide information regarding the chemistry and volume of water
in the groundwater systems.' 2 The revised work plan submitted by SPJV
called for the groundwater pumped from the deep bedrock aquifer to be
discharged into two infiltration galleries, 13 one located in the Blackfoot
River alluvium, and the other in the Landers Fork River alluvium.' 4
The Agency initially approved SPJV's application for amendment of
its exploration license.' 5 The Agency rescinded its approval when it real-
ized the water to be pumped from the bedrock and discharged into the
Blackfoot and Landers Fork alluvia contained constituents, particularly ar-
semc, at greater concentrations than existed in the receiving water.16 After
the rescission, the Agency agreed to SPJV's proposal that areas of the
Landers Fork and Blackfoot alluvia serve as "mixing zones"' 7 in order to
bring the test well discharges into compliance with existing water quality
standards. 18
The waters of both rivers are classified as "lugh quality" waters pursu-
ant to the statutory requirements of section 75-5-301 of the Montana Code
Annotated ("MCA"). Under the same chapter, section 75-5-303 (the
"Nondegradation Policy") prohibits degradation of high quality waters un-
less the proposed degrading activity is reviewed by the Agency, and the
party seeking approval for degrading activity demonstrates by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that:
a) degradation is necessary because there are no economi-
cally, environmentally, and technologically feasible modifica-
tions to the proposed project that would result in no degrada-
tion; and
b) the proposed project will result in important economic or
social development and that the benefit of the development
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Infiltration gallenes are basically long trenches. Br. of Resp. Agency at 3, MEIC, 988 P.2d
1236 (Mont. 1999) (No. 97-455), available at http:lwww.lawlibrary.state.mt.us/dscgi/ds.pylView/Col-
lection-1220.
14. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1238. The term "alluvium" refers to the porous gravel of the river valley
floor. See Mont. Code. Ann. § 84-2-203 (1997).
15. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1238.
16. Id.
17. A "mixng zone" is defined as an area established in a permit or final decision on nondegrada-
tion issued by the department where water quality standards may be exceeded, subject to conditions that
are imposed by the department and that are consistent with the rules adopted by the board. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 75-5-103(18) (1997).
18. The Montana water quality standard for protection of health from arsenic is .018 mg/l. See
Montana Water Quality Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-301 (1997).
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exceeds the costs to society of allowing degradation of high-
quality waters; and
c) existing and anticipated use of state waters will be fully
protected; and
d) the least degrading water quality protection practices deter-
mined by the department to be econonically, environmentally,
and technologically feasible will be fully implemented by the
applicant prior to and dunng the proposed activity '9
The Nondegradation Policy further exempts from review certain activ-
ities listed in section 75-5-317, MCA (1995).20 In particular, the 1995 leg-
islature added section 75-5-317(2)0) (hereinafter Degradation Review
Waiver), an exemption for "discharges of water from water well or monitor-
ing well tests, conducted in accordance with department-approved water
quality protection practices. ' 1
Officials at the Agency determined the mixing zone in the Blackfoot
alluvial aquifer could extend 5,000 feet downhill from the Blackfoot infil-
tration gallery, and the Landers Fork mixing zone could extend 4,000 feet
from its infiltration gallery 22 The Agency estimated that arsenic would
dilute to meet water quality standards when the discharged water traveled
2,000 feet from the Blackfoot infiltration gallery, and 1,500 feet from the
Landers Fork infiltration gallery 23 The existing arsenic level in the
groundwater of the Blackfoot and Landers Fork alluvia near the test well
discharge is no more than .003 milligrams per liter (mgl).24 After the
Agency authorized the test well discharges, pumping began on July 25,
1995, and continued until November 8, 1995.25 By October 11, 1995, mon-
itoring data was available regarding the discharged water and its effect on
the surface water of the two rivers.26 In the 1995 tests, levels of arsenic at
the wellheads ranged from .016 to .056 mg/. 27 Due to chemical changes
caused by exposure to the atmosphere, the levels of arsenic in the water as it
entered the infiltration galleries fell between .015 to .020 mg/l.28 The high-
19. Mor. CODE ANN. § 75-5-303(3) (1999).
20. Morr. CODE ANN. § 75-5-303(2) (1999).
21. Morr. CODE ANN. § 75-5-317(2)(j) (1997). Amendments in 1990 specified that the subsection
exempted "discharges of water to ground water " MoTr. CODE ANN. § 75-5-317(2)(j) (1999) (emphasis
added).
22. See MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1238.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Br. of Appellant Groups at 5, MEIC, 988 P.2d 1236 (1999)(No. 97-455), available at http:/
www.lawlibrary.state.mt.us/dscgilds.pyNiew/Collection-1220.
26. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1239.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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est concentration of arsemc leaving either infiltration gallery was .009 mg/
1.29 The Agency then authorized pump tests for the summers of 1996 and
1997 30
B. Procedural Background
On October 6, 1995, three environmental interest groups (the
"Groups"), the Montana Environmental Information Center, the Clark Fork
Pend-Oreille Coalition, and Women's Voices for the Earth filed suit against
the Agency 31 The Groups alleged damage from the discharge of polluted
water into the Blackfoot and Landers Fork Rivers.32 On motion for sum-
mary judgment, they sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Agency to
comply with the Nondegradation Policy In particular, the Groups sought a
ruling that if the Agency relied on an exemption in the Degradation Review
Waiver to excuse their lack of confornnty with the Nondegradation Policy,
the Degradation Review Waiver was void because it violated Article IX,
Section 1, subsections 1 and 3 of the Montana Constitution.33 Article IX,
Section 1(1) provides, "The state and each person shall mamtain and im-
prove a clean and healthful environment for present and future genera-
tions." Article IX, Section 1(3) provides, "The legislature shall provide ad-
equate remedies for the protection of the environmental life support system
from degradation and provide adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable
depletion and degradation of natural resources." In support of their motion
for summary judgment, the Groups introduced expert testimony to establish
that the United States Environmental Protection Agency had not only clas-
sified arsemc as a carcinogen known to cause skin cancer in humans, but
had also found an association between internal cancer and arsemc intake in
humans.34 The Groups' expert also concluded the Agency had not ade-
quately considered the public health risks associated with the discharge of
arsemc into the riversY.3  Given the carcmogemc nature of arsemc, the well
test discharges were not "insignificant" as contemplated under the Degrada-
tion Review Waiver.36
29. Id. at 1240.
30. The 1997 well test discharges were not part of the litigation reviewed by the court. Appellants'
Rep. Br. at 3, MEIC, 988 P.2d 1236 (1999)(No. 97-455), available at http:lwww.lawlibrary.state.mt.us/
dscgi/ds.pyNiew/Collection-1220.
31. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1239. SPJV was granted leave to intervene shortly after the Groups filed
suit against the Agency.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1237.
34. Id. at 1239.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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The Groups further argued the Degradation Review Waiver violated
the fundamental environmental rights contained in Article II, Section 3, and
Article IX, Section 1, and so required the court to strictly scrutinize the
Degradation Review Waiver.3 7 Article II, Section 3 of the Montana Consti-
tution enumerates the inalienable rights of Montana citizens. It provides in
pertinent part, "All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights.
They include the right to a clean and healthful environment -38 In
order to justify abridgement of the Groups' fundamental constitutional
rights, strict scrutiny would require the government to demonstrate: 1) a
compelling state interest for the dangerous exemption in the Degradation
Review Waiver; 2) that the Degradation Review Waiver was closely tai-
lored to accomplish only that interest; and 3) the Degradation Review
Waiver provided the least onerous path available to accomplish the govern-
ment's goal.
39
The Agency also sought summary judgment. It highlighted testimony
showing arsenic levels were diluted to the level existing in the groundwater
a short distance from the point of discharge."n The Agency argued this fact
established that the discharges were non-significant and exempt from the
review requirements in subsection 3 of the Nondegradation Policy 41
Therefore, the Groups were not able to demonstrate a violation of their con-
stitutional rights, and strict scrutiny of the Degradation Review Waiver was
not required.42 Additionally, because the Groups were not able to demon-
strate injury in fact, they lacked standing to challenge the Degradation Re-
view Waiver.43
The district court ruled that Article II, Section 3 provides a fundamen-
tal right to a clean and healthy environment. 4 Judge Sherlock interpreted
the Groups' challenge of the Degradation Review Waiver as an "as-ap-
plied" challenge because the Groups did not argue the exemption statute
was unconstitutional in every possible application.4 5 Furthermore, the
Groups had to prove an actual injury before strict scrutiny of the exemption
statute could be applied.46 The court ruled the Groups had not proven an
actual injury had occurred because: 1) the Groups had not demonstrated
37. Id. at 1240.
38. MONT. CONsT. art. H, § 3.
39. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1240.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1241.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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the discharges from the mixing zones (as opposed to discharges at the well
heads) violated water quality standards; 2) there was no showing of a sig-
nificant change to the water quality on the surface of either river; and 3)
there was no demonstration that the waters of either river were so affected
so as to threaten public health or violate water quality standards to the ex-
tent there was a significant impact on either river.47 Following these rul-
ings, the district court granted summary judgment for the Agency 48
I. IssuEs AND HOLDING
On appeal, the Groups argued the exemption contained in the Degrada-
tion Review Waiver was an unconstitutional exclusion from the
nondegradation review process required by the Nondegradation Policy be-
cause degradation was inevitable in certain instances."9 They also argued
the constitutional environmental protections were intended to be prophylac-
tic, and therefore the district court erred in refusing to apply strict scrutiny
without a showing of risk to human or environmental health.5" The Groups
contended an existing Agency admimstrative rule classified as significant
any discharges with carcinogenic concentrations greater than the carcmo-
genic concentrations contained in the receiving water."i Because of the
rule, the only demonstration of harm necessary was that the levels of arse-
mc, a known carcinogen, at the point of discharge from the well heads were
greater than those in the receiving water.52
In response, the Agency argued the Groups had not demonstrated even
a threatened injury since arsenic levels diluted to the levels contained in the
47. lId
48. Id.
49. Id. This is particularly relevant given the massive amount of discharge present in this case and
the likely cumulative effects of arseme contained in the discharge. Appellants' Br. at 6-8, MEIC, 988
P.2d 1236 (1999) (No. 97-455), available at http:llwww.lawlibrary.state.mt.usldscgilds.pylview/Collec-
tion-1220.
50. ld.
51. MoNT. ADMin. R. 17.30.715 (1999), entitled "Criteria for Determining Nonsignificant Changes
in Water Quality," provides in pertinent part:
(1) The following criteria will be used to determine whether certain activities or
classes of activities will result in non-significant changes in existing water quality
due to their low potential to affect human health or the environment. These crite-
na consider the quantity and strength of the pollutant, the length of time the
changes will occur, and the character of the pollutant. Except as provided in (2)
of this rule, changes in existing surface or ground water quality resulting for the
activities that meet all the criteria listed below are non-significant, and are not
required to undergo review under § 75-5-303 MCA:
(b) discharges contaimng carcinogenic parameters less than or equal to the
concentrations of those parameters in the receiving water.
52. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1241.
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receiving water a mere fifty feet from the mixing zones and, hence, the
Groups lacked standing to challenge the Degradation Review Waiver.53
Moreover, the constitutional provisions in question were intended to pro-
hibit only discharges that render the receiving water unclean or unhealthy,
not discharges that merely carry unhealthy or unclean materials. 4
From these arguments, the Montana Supreme Court found two primary
issues to review- 1) whether the Groups had standing to challenge the con-
stitutionality of the Degradation Review Waiver; and if so, 2) whether the
statute implicated either the inalienable right to a clean and healthful envi-
ronment contained in Article II, Section 3, or the environmental protections
of Article IX, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution. By necessity, the
court also decided a third issue - the threshold showing of harm needed to
implicate the constitutional environmental provisions at issue. This deci-
sion on the threshold showing of harm was necessary to determine if the
statute implicated Article II, Section 3, or Article IX, Section 1.
A. Standing Analysis
To determine the applicable standing requirements in this case, the
Montana Supreme Court looked to the two-prong test previously employed
in Gryczan v Montana.56 Under Gryczan, standing is established when: 1)
the complaining party clearly alleges past, present, or threatened injury to a
property or civil right; and 2) the alleged injury can be distinguished from
the injury to the public generally, although not necessarily exclusively to
the complaining party "
In Gryczan, six homosexuals challenged the constitutionality of sec-
tion 45-5-505, MCA, which criminalized consensual sex between adults of
the same gender. Plaintiffs alleged the statute violated the privacy prov-
sion in Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution when applied to
consensual, private, same gender sexual conduct between adults. The State
argued plaintiffs did not have standing because they could not show an
"injury in fact," and no such injury existed absent even a threat of prosecu-
tion under the contested statute.58 The Montana Supreme Court rejected
this argument as inconsistent with prior decisions of both the Montana and
United States Supreme Courts. The Montana Supreme Court cited Babbitt
v United Farm Workers, which acknowledged that "the existence of a
53. Id. at 1242.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Gryczan v. Montana, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997).
57. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1242.
58. Grvczan, 942 P.2d at 117.
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crmunal law aimed specifically at one group of citizens, the enforcement of
which has not been disavowed by the state, creates a fear of prosecution
sufficient to confer standing unless there are other circumstances which
make that fear 'imaginary' or 'wholly speculative."' 59
Because the State had not disavowed any enforcement intention, the
Montana Supreme Court found the plaintiffs had valid reasons to fear pros-
ecution, satisfying the first prong of the standing requirement." The sec-
ond standing prong was also satisfied because the psychological injuries
suffered by the plaintiffs due to the very existence of the statute affected the
plaintiffs in a way particular to them as homosexuals.6 ' Nor did the general
public suffer any injury under the statute because the statute did not
crminalize sexual conduct between heterosexuals. 62
Applying the Gryczan test, the MEIC court looked to Missoula City-
County Air Pollution Control Board v. Board of Environmental Review,
where a local air pollution board challenged the state board's decision to
allow Stone Container, a paper mill outside of Missoula, to increase the
amount of pollutants emitted from a recovery boiler at its kraft pulp mill.6 3
The Air Pollution court found the local board was a "person" within the
statutory defimtion of the word.' 4 Holding that standing existed for anyone
who breathed the air m an airshed where pollution controls were being chal-
lenged, the court found the local board, acting as a pollution control advo-
cate for citizens of the Missoula airshed, had "the equivalent of a personal
stake" in preventing pollution.65 Chief Justice Turnage further noted that
"in the same way as a citizen of the Missoula airshed is more particularly
affected by the State Board's acts than is a citizen of another area, the inter-
est of the local board is distinguishable from and greater than the interest of
the public generally "66 The Air Pollution court made clear potential eco-
nomic injury is an mjury to a property right sufficient to establish stand-
ing.67
The MEIC court chose to address the second prong of the Gryczan test
first. Justice Theweiler analogized Air Pollution to the facts before the
59. Id. at 114 (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).
60. ld.
61. Id. at 120.
62. 1&
63. Missoula City-County Air Pollution Control Bd. v. Board of Envtl. Review, 937 P.2d 463, 465
(Mont. 1997).
64. Id. at 467-68.
65. Id. at 467 ("[I]t is clear to this court that a citizen of Missoula, as one who breathes the air into
which Stone Container is expelling pollutants, would have standing to bnng this action.").
66. IL
67. Id. at 468.
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court, finding the Groups had satisfied the second prong of the standing
requirement because the Groups were concerned with water quality issues,
and had members who allegedly floated, fished, hunted, viewed wildlife68
and consumed the water of the Landers Fork and Blackfoot Rivers.69 In
this way, the environmental interest groups' concern with water quality is-
sues on the two rivers was deemed equivalent to the City-County Air Pollu-
tion Board's concern with pollution in the Missoula airshed. The Groups'
claim of having members who utilized the rivers and the surrounding envi-
rons was enough to find the interest of the Groups in this case distinguisha-
ble from and greater than the general public's interests in the rivers.
The MEIC court never applied the first prong of the standing test, stat-
ing only-
Based on these criteria, we conclude that the allegations in the
Plaintiffs' complaint which are uncontroverted, establish their
standing to challenge conduct which has an arguably adverse
impact on the area in the headwaters of the Blackfoot River in
which they fish and otherwise recreate, and which is a source
of water which many of them consume.7"
From this language, it appears the court found that plaintiffs had clearly
alleged harm, and therefore satisfied the first prong of the standing require-
ment.
Having found standing for the Groups to bring their case, the court
then addressed whether the Groups had demonstrated sufficient harm to im-
plicate their constitutional rights and to trigger strict scrutiny of the stat-
ute.7'
B. Level of Scrutiny
1. Determination of a Fundamental Right
To determine the level of scrutiny to be applied to alleged infringe-
ment of the environmental provisions, the MEIC court first had to examine
the nature of the rights contained in those provisions. To determine the
nature of the Article II's nghts, the court relied on two previous decisions
that set out applicable standards. In Butte Community Union v Lewis, the
court held a right is fundamental if it is contained within Montana's Decla-
ration of Rights, or if it is a right without which other constitutionally guar-
anteed rights would have little meaning. 72 Butte Community Union con-
68. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1237.
69. Id. at 1243.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Mont. 1986) (citing In re C.H., 683
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cerned Article XII, Section 3(3) of the Montana Constitution, which states,
"The legislature shall provide such economic assistance and social and re-
habilitative services as may be necessary for those inhabitants who, by rea-
son of age, infirmities, or misfortune may have need for the aid of society"
At issue in Butte Community Union were proposed state laws that would
have excluded able-bodied persons of certain ages without dependent minor
children from receiving general welfare assistance for basic necessities.73
Because the Montana Constitution's Declaration of Rights does not ex-
pressly provide a right to welfare, the court held it was not a fundamental
nght.74
Later, m Wadsworth v. Montana, the court held the right to pursue
life's basic necessities is a fundamental right, expressed in the Declaration
of Rights.75 Consequently, the most stringent standard of review, strict
scrutiny, is imposed when the action challenged interferes with the exercise
of a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class.7 6 The plain-
tiff in Wadsworth was a Department of Revenue employee discharged for
noncompliance with newly implemented conflict of interest rules prohibit-
ing Department of Revenue employees from engaging in outside employ-
ment.77 Because the rules implicated the inalienable right to pursue life's
basic necessities found m the Montana Constitution's Declaration of Rights,
the Wadsworth court held the opportumty to pursue employment is a funda-
mental right and therefore applied strict scrutiny to the rule.78 Because the
State's action in enforcing the rule was unconstitutional under this level of
scrutiny, the employee was wrongfully discharged from ins job.7 9
2. The Inalienable Right to a Clean and Healthful Environment of
Article II, Section 3
Consistent with Butte Community Union, the MEIC court found the
right to a clean and healthful environment is a fundamental right because it
is contained in the Declaration of Rights in Article H, Section 3 of the Mon-
tana Constitution. 0 According to Wadsworth, any action that interferes
P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1984)); see also MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1245 (adopting the Butte Community Union
standard).
73. Butte Community Union, 712 P.2d at 1310.
74. Id. at 1312.
75. Wadsworth v. Montana, 911 P.2d 1165, 1174 (Mont. 1996).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1167-68.
78. Id. at 1174.
79. Id. at 1175.
80. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1246.
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with or infringes on a fundamental right is subject to strict scrutiny 81
Therefore, any statute or rule that implicates the inalienable right to a clean
and healthful environment is subject to strict scrutiny 82 After completing
the analysis of the right to a clean and healthful environment, the court
turned to an analysis of the environmental rights contained in Article IX,
Section 1.
3. The Environmental Rights Provisions of Article IX, Section 1
The rights in Article IX, Section 1 are not generally subject to a strict
scrutiny analysis because they are not contained in the Declaration of
Rights.83 The rights provided in Article IX would normally be subject to
"middle-tier" scrutiny, which applies when a constitutionally protected in-
terest is implicated. s4 The State must demonstrate that its classification is
reasonable, and that its interest in classifying is more important than the
people's interest in obtaining the constitutional benefit.85 In General Agri-
culture Corporation v Moore, the court set forth its guiding principle of
constitutional interpretation, stating:
[T]he prime effort or fundamental purpose in construing a
constitutional provision, is to ascertain and to give effect to
the intent of the framers and of the people who adopted it.
The court, therefore, should constantly keep in mind the object
sought to be accomplished and proper regard given to the
evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. 86
Based on this principle of constitutional interpretation and its reading
of the transcripts of the 1972 Constitutional Convention, the MEIC court
concluded that "the nature of the environmental rights provided for by Arti-
cle II and IX cannot be interpreted separately [as] it was the delegates'
intention that the two provisions compliment each other, and be applied in
tandem."8s7 The court thus determined that the framers intended the envi-
ronmental rights guaranteed by Article II, Section 3 and the rights provided
for in Article IX, Section 1 to be interrelated and interdependent. 88 The
court further held the two articles must be scrutinized consistently 89
Therefore, state or private action that implicates either constitutional provi-
81. Id. at 1245.
82. Id. at 1246.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id at 1245 (citing Butte Community Union, 712 P.2d at 1314).
86. General Agric. Corp. v. Moore, 534 P.2d 859, 864 (Mont. 1975).
87. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1246.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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sion will be strictly scrutimzed.9"
After determining the fundamental nature of the environmental rights
contained in Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1, the court turned
its attention to the showing necessary to implicate those rights and trigger
strict scrutiny 91
C. Threshold Showing of Harm
The Agency and SPJV contended actual danger to human or environ-
mental health must be demonstrated before strict scrutiny review is trig-
gered. 92 - The Groups relied on an Agency rule93 to make a showing of
harm. 94 Tis admimstrative rule sets out the criteria to determine what con-
stitutes a non-significant change in existing water quality Discharges con-
taming carcinogen levels at concentrations less than or equal to carcinogen
levels in the receiving water are non-significant.95 Discharges contaimng
carcinogen levels greater than those in the receiving water are deemed sig-
nificant. The EPA classifies arseic as a carcinogen.96 The background
level of arsemc in the Landers Fork and Blackfoot alluvia is .003 mg/I. 97
Test well discharges contained arseic concentrations of up to .009 mg/l.98
The Groups claimed that because the test well discharges contained arseic
at concentrations three times higher than the background level of arseic,
degradation occurred m violation of the Montana Constitution.99 This deg-
radation was sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny of the blanket exemption of
well tests permitted by the Degradation Review Waiver."°
Addressing the Groups' contention that this level of degradation was
sufficient harm to trigger strict scrutiny review, the court once more relied
on the transcripts of the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention and the
principles of constitutional interpretation set out in General Agriculture.'0
The debate among the delegates over the inclusion of the "clean and health-
ful" language highlights the clear and unequivocal intent to make the provi-
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1244.
93. MoNT. ADmi. R. 17.30.715(1)(b) (1999). At the time the suit was filed, this rule was codified
at MoNT. ADmIN. R. 16.20.712(1)(b) (1995).
94. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1240.
95. See MoNT. ADMIN. R. 17.30.715 (1999), set forth supra note 51.
96. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1239.
97. Id. at 1240.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1240-41.
101. I& at 1244-48.
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sions as strong as they could be."' 2 The transcripts revealed, "[O]ur intent
was to permit no degradation from the present environment and affirma-
tively require enhancement of what we have now "o103
After a fairly extensive review of the Constitutional Convention tran-
scripts, particularly of the Natural Resources and Agricultural Committee
responsible for reporting Article IX, Section 1, the court concluded that the
delegates' intention was to provide language and protections which are both
anticipatory and preventive.' 4 Justice Trieweiler wrote:
The delegates did not intend to merely prohibit that degree of
environmental degradation which can be conclusively linked
to ill health or physical endangerment. Our constitution does
not require that dead fish float on the surface of our state's
rivers and streams before its farsighted environmental protec-
tions can be invoked.
10 5
Accordingly, the court found the district court erred in ruling the envi-
ronmental rights of Article II and Article IX were not implicated absent
proof that public health was threatened or water quality standards were so
affected to significantly impact either river.10 6 Because the Agency had
concluded in its own rule that discharges containing carcinogen levels
greater than those contained in receiving water have a significant impact
and are usually subject to nondegradation review required by the
Nondegradation Policy,' 7 the Groups' demonstration that the well tests ad-
ded arsenic to the environment in greater concentrations than were present
in the receiving water clearly implicated their constitutional right to a clean
and healthful environment, as well as the right to be free from unreasonable
degradation of the environment.'08
The court further noted that the Nondegradation Policy's review pro-
cess fulfilled the legislature's duties set forth in Article IX, Section 1.
However, because the activities listed in the Degradation Review Waiver
were arbitrarily excluded from nondegradation review "without regard to
the nature or volume of the substances being discharged," the degradation
waiver violated the constitutional rights guaranteed by Article II, Section 3
and Article IX, Section 1.109
102. Id. at 1248.
103. Id. at 1247 (quoting comments of Delegate McNeil, Montana Constitutional Convention,
Vol. IV at 1205 (1972) (emphasis added)).
104. Id. at 1249.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. MONT. ADMIN. R. 17.30.715 (1995).
108. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1249.
109. Id.
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D. Remand Instructions
Tins decision was not the final disposition of the case. The judgment
of the district court was reversed, and the case remanded with instructions
to render a decision consistent with the court's opimon."10 Specifically, to
lower court was instructed to strictly scrutinize the Degradation Review
Waiver for a determination of whether there was a compelling state interest
for the enactment of that statute based on the criteria set out in Montana v.
Wadsworth."'
E. The Special Concurrences
Justice Leaphart filed a special concurrence in the case."12 It high-
lights many of the inconsistencies of the majority opinion. The most glar-
ing inconsistency is how to interpret the court's holding that "we will apply
strict scrutiny to state or private action which implicates either constitu-
tional provision.""' 3 Questioning this broad statement, Justice Leaphart
raised two issues. First, he noted that private action was not before the
court as the subject of the appeal." 4 He reminded the majority that strict
scrutiny analysis requires the state to demonstrate a compelling interest for
its action and to closely tailor its action to effectuate that interest with the
least onerous path that can be taken to achieve the state's objective." 5 Pri-
vate action does not lend itself to this analysis, and for this reason Justice
Leaphart concluded this statement is best considered dictum."1 6
The second issue addressed by Justice Leaphart was whether the ma-
jority correctly interpreted the Groups' challenge as "as applied," or
whether it was more properly interpreted as a facial challenge. 117 Justice
Leaphart questioned the court's conclusion that:
to the extent § 75-5-317(j), MCA (1995), arbitrarily excludes
certain "activities" from nondegradation review without re-
gard to the nature or volume of the substances being dis-
charged, it violates those environmental rights guaranteed by
Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1 of the Montana
Constitution. Our holding is limited to § 75-5-317(2)(j),
110. l
iil. Id
112. Id. at 1250 (Leaphart, J., concurring). Cluef Justice Turnage joined in this special concur-
rence.
113. Id. at 1246 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 1250 (Leaphart, J., concurring).
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id. Justice Gray filed a separate special concurrence to join Justice Leaphart's opimon solely
on the "private action" issue. Id. at 1251 (Gray, L, concurring).
117. Id at 1250 (Leaphart, J., concurring).
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MCA (1995), as applied to the facts of this case. We have not
been asked to and do not hold that this section facially impli-
cates constitutional rights.'8
According to Justice Leaphart, the constitutional infirmity of the Deg-
radation Review Waiver was not limited to the facts of the case at hand, but
in the creation of a blanket exception to nondegradation review for dis-
charges from water well or monitoring well tests without regard to the harm
caused by those tests, or the potentially degrading effect those discharges
may have on the surrounding or recipient environment. 1 9 The possibility
that some discharges will not harm the environment does not justify exemp-
tion from review by the state. Excluding water well discharges from review
makes it impossible for the state to "prevent unreasonable depletion and
degradation of natural resources" as required by the constitution. 20 For
this reason, Justice Leaphart concluded this case should have been inter-
preted as a facial challenge. 12 1
IV DiscussION
The MEIC decision is undoubtedly important. Unfortunately, it is not
as precise as one would hope given that importance. This section will dis-
cuss the court's holding on standing, the facial challenge versus "as-ap-
plied" challenge distinction, the private action issue, and analyze the doc-
trine of self-execution and its importance in applying constitutional provi-
sions. It will also address the nature of affirmative rights, as well as attempt
to explain the importance of the interrelation and interdependence of Article
II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1.
A. Standing
The standing doctrine is a junsprudential concept of justiciability for-
mulated to limit access to courts by requiring a determination of "whether
the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues." ' 2 At its simplest, the standing doctrne determines the
proper party to bring suit.' 23 As noted above, the court used the two-prong
standing test derived from Gryczan v Montana. The test for standing stated
in Gryczan and adopted by the MEIC requires that 1) the complaining party
118. Id. at 1249.
119. Id. at 1250 (Leaphart, J., concurring).
120. Id. (quoting Mor-. CONST. art. IX, § 1(3)).
121. Id.
122. Trent Baker, Judicial Enforcement of Forest Plans in the Wake of Oho Forestry, 21 PUB.
LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 81, 82 (2000).
123. Id. at 83.
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must clearly allege past, present, or threatened injury to a property or civil
right; and 2) the alleged imjury must be distinguished from the injury to the
public generally, but the mjury need not be exclusive to the complainmg
party 124 In MEIC, the court first addressed the second prong of the test and
found it satisfied. However, the court did not apply the first prong of the
test. Instead, the court cited the Air Pollution opmion 125 as an example of a
case where it had applied both prongs of the standing test. In that case, the
court found a sufficient injury to the local board's property rights because it
would be forced to incur expenses to monitor, collect, and analyze pollution
data, and to develop a regulatory response which would ensure Missoula air
quality met mmnimum federal standards in the face of increased pollution
emanating from Stone Container.'26
The lack of analysis regarding the first prong poses some interesting
questions. Although the court found the MEIC Groups had standing, it is
unclear whether the court found standing existed based on potential eco-
nomic injury (an injury to a property right), or whether standing was based
on a potential injury to a civil right, i.e. the rights found in Article II, Sec-
tion 3 or Article IX, Section 1. The court's analogy to Air Pollution implies
that standing was based on potential economic mjury However, the court
made no findings of threatened economic injury in MEIC. Further, the con-
dition leading to a finding of potential economic injury in Air Pollution was
not present in MEIC. The local board in Air Pollution was legally obligated
to develop a regulatory response to increased pollution. The environmental
orgamzations in MEIC had no legal obligations to their members or to the
public at large to monitor, analyze, or collect pollution data or develop any
regulatory response to pollution in the rivers, so it is difficult to discern a
comparable threat of economic injury in the two cases.
The remaining possibility is that standing was based on a threatened
injury to a civil right, as was the mjury alleged by the Gryczan plaintiffs. In
Gryczan, the civil right at stake was the constitutionally protected right to
privacy In MEIC, the court again made no findings to indicate which civil
right or rights were threatened. The lack of clarity on this point gives rise
to uncertainty as to whether a future plaintiff alleging an injury to the fun-
damental environmental rights guaranteed in Article II, Section 3 or Article
IX, Section 1 will have standing on the strength of that allegation alone, or
if more is needed.
124. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1242 (emphasis added).
125. Id at 1242-43 (citing ALr Pollution, 937 P.2d at 467-68).
126. Air Pollution, 937 P.2d at 468.
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B. The Self-execution Doctrine
At no point in the opinion does the MEIC court engage in any analysis
of whether the constitutional provisions in question are self-executing. This
is a critical oversight because the provisions by their nature invite a discus-
sion of self-execution. By virtue of the ultimate holding in the case, it ap-
pears the court assumed the provisions to be self-executing. However, the
complete silence on such an important aspect of constitutional interpretation
makes such an assumption problematic.
Generally, a self-executing constitutional provision can be defined as
one that 1) is able to operate without any further legislation, and 2) is as-
sumed to be in operation from the moment of its passage. 27 A non-self-
executing provision is exactly the opposite - it needs supplemental legisla-
tion in order to be effective, or it assumes the existence of certain legislative
machinery necessary for carrying out its mandate.128 Most importantly, the
issue of self-execution goes directly to the issue of separation of powers. If
a provision is found to be self-executing, a legislature is necessarily limited
to enacting laws that are in "harmony with the constitution and further the
exercise of the constitutional right and make it more available."' 129 If a
constitutional provision is found to be non-self-executing, the legislature
must act for the provision to become operative. At the point of non-self-
execution, separation of powers becomes relevant. Because the non-self
executing constitutional provision needs legislative action to become opera-
tive, it follows that a degree of deference should be afforded by the judici-
ary to a legislative act or agency decision that purports to conform to the
provision's intent.
130
This model of constitutional interpretation seems particularly relevant
to the following facts that were before the MEIC court: 1) the 1972 Consti-
tution was adopted and had provisions aimed at protecting the environment
included in it; 2) the legislature amended the Montana Water Quality Act
with reference to the constitutional provisions; 13' 3) the legislature later en-
acted an exemption to the Montana Water Quality Act for certain activities
including water well or monitoring well tests; 4) the state agency charged
with issuing permits under the exemption statute did so for a mining com-
pany; 5) the mining company then conducted tests under the auspices of
that permit. If the mining company's activities are challenged and the chal-
lenging party invokes the constitutional environmental provisions, an analy-
127. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 98 (1998).
128. Id. at § 99.
129. Id. at § 101.
130. Id. at § 261.
131. Montana Water Quality Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-101 to 75-5-705 (1995).
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sis of whether the provisions are self-executing seems appropriate because
the legislature's interpretation of the Montana Constitution is directly at
issue.
1. Self-Execution In Montana
The court's seminal opinion on the nature of self-executing rights is
found in Montana ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre.'32 In Staf-
ford, the court ultimately refused to declare games of chance illegal despite
a constitutional prohibition, because the legislature had not fulfilled its con-
stitutional mandate to enact laws prohibiting such activities. 133 The court
reasoned the judiciary is charged with interpreting all existing laws, and to
do more would "usurp" the respective role of the legislature. 134 On its face,
MEIC appears to impliedly overturn Stafford. However, the facts of Staf-
ford were fundamentally different than those of MEIC. First, the constitu-
tional background detailing the debate around the anti-lottery provisions
was not nearly as extensive as the 1972 Constitutional Convention tran-
scripts detailing the debate surrounding the environmental provisions.
Quite simply, the Stafford court could not compare the intent behind the
constitutional provisions to the language ultimately adopted. Second, Staf-
ford was a case where the legislature had not acted at all, whereas the MEIC
decision had a specific legislative action to provide context. Third, the
Montana legislature has a long history of looking the other way when it
comes to extractive industries, especially mimng interests. 135 Lastly, the
court disposed of the MEIC case cautiously, with a remand to the district
court for a determination of the existence of a compelling state interest to
exclude well water discharges from nondegradation review
In light of the factual differences between Stafford and MEIC, the
court acted prudently and cautiously However, the court's silence on the
important and critical point ,of self-execution versus non-self-execution ulti-
mately lessens the clarity of the opinion for future application, even though
132. Montana ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre Corp., 132 P.2d 689 (Mont. 1942).
133. l at 703. The 1889 Montana Constitution's prohibition stated, "The legislature shallhave
no power to authorize lotteries, or gift enterprises for any purpose, and shall pass laws to prohibit the
sale of lottery or gift enterprise tickets in this state." MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XIX, § 2.
134. Stafford, 132 P.2d at 703.
135. See generally JERRE C. MuRPuy, TiHE CoMiCAL HISTORY OF MONTANA - A SEmous STORY
FOR FREE PEOPLE - BEING AN AccouNT OF THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA'S TREAsuRE STATE BY ALIEN
CORPORATE COMBInE, Tan CONFISCATION OF rrs RESOURCES, THE SUBJUGATION OF ITS PEOPLE, AND
THE CoRRunION OF FREE GovERNMENT TO T=E Usas OF LAwLESS ENTERPRisE AND ORGANIZED GREED
EMPLOYED IN "BIG BUSINESS" (E.L. Schofield Pub. 1912); JOSEPH KINSEY HowARD, MONTANA, HIGH,
WIDE AND HANDsoME (Umversity of Nebraska Press 1959); K. Ross TOOLE, MONTANA: AN UNCOM-
MON LAND (University of Oklahoma Press 1959); Harry W. Fritz, The 1972 Constitutional Convention
in a Contemporary Context, 51 MONT. L. REv. 270 (1990).
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Stafford was decided under the previous constitution. Further, the lack of
self-execution discussion makes the opinion vulnerable to criticism because
the Stafford opinion does exist and does, on its face, appear to be contrary
to the court's holding in MEIC
While Stafford addressed self-execution under the prior state constitu-
tion, the first case to address the issue of self-execution after the adoption of
the 1972 constitution was General Agriculture Corporation v Moore.'36 In
General Agriculture, the court addressed the constitutional water rights pro-
visions, finding three of the subsections self-executing, even though the
fourth subsection contained a mandate for legislative action.' 37
Although MEIC was the first time the Montana Supreme Court ad-
dressed the Montana Constitution's environmental provisions in a substan-
tive matter, it was not the first time the legal commumty in Montana had
considered the provisions. The issue of self-execution in relation to the
environmental rights provisions in Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Sec-
tion 1 has been discussed at length on three occasions prior to MEIC 138
The commentators came to different opinions about the self-executing na-
ture of the rights. However, given the dearth of Montana case law on the
matter, their conclusions as to each of the provisions at issue in MEIC are
worth considering.
a. Self-Execution and the Inalienable Right to a Clean and
Healthful Environment of Article II, Section 3
Legal scholars have reached different conclusions on the self-execut-
ing nature of the "clean and healthful" provision contained in Article II,
Section 3. Generally, constitutional provisions in bills of rights are pre-
sumed to be self-executing. 139 Courts may be inclined to interpret provi-
sions as self-executing rather than requiring implementing legislation to
give judicial significance to the provisions. If not treated as self-executing,
the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
136. General Agric. Corp. v. Moore, 534 P.2d 859, 862 (Mont. 1975).
137. Id. ("We construe Article IX, Section 3(l) of the 1972 Constitution as not only reaffirmlng
the public policy of the 1889 Constitution but also as recognizing and confirming all rights acquired
under that Constitution and the implementing statutes enacted thereunder. Construed in this context,
Article IX, Section 3, with the exception of subdivision (4), is self-executing."); see also discussion,
infra part IV.B.3.
138. See Carl W Tobias and Daniel N. McLean, The Effect of the Environmental Policy Acts on
Pre-Existing Agency Authority, 41 MoNT. L. REv. 177 (1980); John L. Horwich, Montana s Consutu-
tional Environmental Quality Provisions: Self-Execution or Self-Delusion? 57 MoNTr. L. REv. 323
(1996); Tammy Wyatt-Shaw, The Doctrine of Self-Execution and the Environmental Provisions of the
Montana State Constitution: "They Mean Something, " 15 PUB. LAND L. Rev. 219 (1994).
139. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Lav § 98 (1998).
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directions of the fundamental law 140 Because the framers' included the
clean and healthful provision in the Bill of Rights section of the Montana
Constitution, it is self-executing. This conclusion is bolstered by the clear
intent and understanding of the framers. 1 1 This last concept, that it is
within the discretion of those who adopt a constitution to make some of its
provisions self-executing, was cited by the court with approval in General
Agrculture. 142
One scholar in particular challenges the conclusion that the "clean and
healthful" provision of Article II, Section 3 is self-executing on the follow-
ing two grounds: 1) the provision cannot be construed as self-executing
because the words "clean" and "healthful" are vague; and 2) the provision
provides no instruction as to remedy or enforcement.143 Absent any defim-
tional standards to employ, a court should seek "refuge" in a finding of non-
self-execution as other state courts have when interpreting similar constitu-
tional provisions. 1" In this manner, courts will err on the better side of
judicial restraint and not cross separation of powers boundaries. 145
Tins analytical model seems unnecessarily confusing. Some of the
neighboring clauses in Article II, Section 3 use words like "lives" and "lib-
erties" that have a clear legal meaning, and some do not. In addition to the
right to a clean and healthful environment, other provisions in the Bill of
Rights utilizing words like "safety" and "happiness" could also be deemed
legally ambiguous. If those rights that have a clear legal meamng are self-
executing and those that do not are non-self-executing, then this model of
analysis would render the majority of the inalienable rights in the Montana
Constitution merely aspirational. Tins model deems some rights contained
in the inalienable rights clause truly inalienable, while other rights are not,
despite their location in the same section of the constitution, or even the
same sentence.
The remaining questions to be answered are whether the term "clean
140. d at § 100.
141. Proceedings of the Montana Constitutional Convention 5067-68 (1972). Delegate Dahood
was specifically responding to a question from Delegate Robinson that expressed her worry the provi-
sion might need complete legislative implementation to make it effective. Delegate Dahood responded,
"[C]onstitutions are based on the premise that they are presumed to be self-executing particularly within
the bill of rights. If the language appears to be prohibitory and mandatory, as thus particular section is
intended to be, then in that event, the courts interpreting the particular section are bound by that particu-
lar presumption and they must assume in that situation that it is self-executing." Id.
142. General Agnc., 534 P.2d at 862 (citing 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 48).
143. See Horwich, 57 MoNT. L. R v. 323, 362 An example of a non-self-executing provision is
Article VIII, Section 10 in the Montana Constitution: "The legislature shall by law limit the debt of
counties, cities, towns and all other local government entities." Id at 335.
144. Id at 362-63.
145. L at 365.
2001] 117
118 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW [Vol.22
and healthful" is so vague as to defy judicial enforcement, and whose defi-
nitions will suffice when giving effect to the inalienable right to a clean and
healthful environment. The MEIC court did not endeavor to provide a pre-
cise definition of its own. Instead, the court began at the beginning, with a
thorough examination of the Constitutional Convention transcripts. The
opinion cited to the debate by members of the Natural Resources and Agri-
cultural Committee over the inclusion of the modifying adjectives "clean
and healthful" to "environment." '46 All committee members wanted the
strongest environmental protection possible. The concern was that adding
"clean and healthful" would allow degradation. As Delegate McNeil noted,
"We did not want the Supreme Court of this state or the Legislature to be
able to say that the environment, as we know it now, can be degraded to a
healthful environment."147 The delegates did not wish to allow polluters
the ability to "parade in some doctors who could say that if a person can
walk around with four pounds of arsenic in his lungs or S02 gas in his
lungs and wasn't dead, that that would be a healthful environment."14 8 The
court also cited Delegate McNeil's later comments that the committee's
"intention was to permit no degradation from the present environment
"149 Although Delegate McNeil's comments were made specifically in
reference to Article IX, Section 1, the language for Article II, Section 3 was
taken directly from Article IX. The right provided in Article II was in-
tended to balance the duty mandated by Article IX.'50 By relying on the
Constitutional Convention transcripts, the court acknowledged and clarified
that it is the framers of the constitution who defined "clean and healthful,"
and no further definition was necessary Thus, it is hard to see why the
definition of clean and healthful provided by the framers cannot function as
a baseline definition.
The term "clean and healthful" is defined by the framers of the consti-
tution in such a manner that it is not so ambiguous to preclude judicial
enforcement. Indeed, the definition provided is more than adequate to
guide judicial application of the environmental right. This, combined with
its location in the Bill of Rights, leads to the conclusion the Article II, Sec-
tion 3 right to a clean and healthful environment is self-executing.
146. See MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1246.
147. Id. at 1247 (quoting comments of Delegate McNeil).
148. Id. at 1246.
149. Id. at 1247.
150. Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1639 (1972)("[I]t seems to me that we are
providing here, though, a clear intent. It does present the right of every person. And we ve already
talked about the duties of persons, and it's nice to balance it with this right.") (Comments of Delegate
Burkhart).
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b. Self-Execution and the Environmental Rights of Article IX,
Section 1(1) and (3)
A determination of the self-executing nature of the environmental pro-
visions in Article IX, Section 1 is not as clear. Article IX, Section 1 states
in its entirety-
1) The state and each person shall maintain and improve a
clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and
future generations.
2) The legislature shall provide for the administration and en-
forcement of this duty
3) The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the
protection of the environmental life support system from deg-
radation and provide adequate remedies to prevent unreasona-
ble depletion and degradation of natural resources.' 5 1
Unlike Article II, Section 3, the right found in Article IX, Section 1(1)
is followed by a command to the legislature in Section 1(2) to provide for
the maintenance and improvement of a clean and healthful environment.'52
Additionally, Article IX, Section 1(3) clearly calls for legislative action,
albeit in the context of providing remedies. Imtially, these provisions
would seem to be classically non-self-executing because they command
legislative action.
However, some scholars who have examined Article IX, Section 1
have arrived at the conclusion Article IX, section 1(1) is self-executing, and
Article X, section 1(2) is merely supplementary 153 Like the court's opm-
ion in MEIC, the conclusion that Article IX, section 1(1) is self-executing
relies both on the Constitutional Convention records and the holding of
General Agriculture.
The court's ruling in General Agriculture is not as supportive of self-
execution as the Constitutional Convention transcripts. The court's primary
holding in that case was that three of the four sections of the water rights
provisions in Article IX, Section 3 are self-executing. 154 The first subsec-
151. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
152. One of the criticisms of MEIC is the court's failure to even cite Article IX, Section 1(2). See
generally John L. Horwich, MEIC v. DEQ: An Inadequate Effort to Address the Meaning of Montana's
Constitutional Environmental Provisions, 62 MONT. L. Rav. 269 (2001).
153. See Tobias and McLean, supra note 138, at 259.
154. General Agnc., 534 P.2d at 862 (construing Article IX, Section 3 of the 1972 Montana Con-
stitution). Article IX, Section 3 provides m its entirety:
(1) All existing rights to the use of any waters for any useful or beneficial pur-
pose are hereby recognized and confirmed.
(2) The use of all water that is now or may hereafter be appropriated for sale,
rent, distribution, or other beneficial use, the right of way over the lands of others
for all ditches, drains, flumes, canals, and aqueducts necessarily used in connec-
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tion of Article IX, section 3 confirms existing water rights, the second de-
fines future appropriations as public uses, and the third claims dominion
over all water within state boundaries. The fourth is a command to the
legislature. The court found the first three sections are self-executing and
the fourth, which seems to refer to the rights mentioned in the first three, to
be non-self-executing. 55 By analogy, because Article IX, Sections ll)
and (2) follow the same pattern, they also are self-executing and non-self-
executing respectively The weakness of this argument is that the fourth
subsection of Article IX, Section 3 is not specifically dedicated to the first
three.156 Indeed, it could stand on its own without the preceding provisions.
That is clearly not the case with Article IX, Section 1(2) - which can only
be understood in conjunction with Section 1(1).
One Montana scholar concluded Section 1(2) is integral to Section
1(1), and not supplementary 157 His support for this contention relies on a
parsing of the text of Section 1(2). One must construe the word "adminis-
tration" as a supplementary mandate to Section 1(1), and interpret "enforce-
ment" to signal a mandate integral to Section 1(1).158 Because an integral
mandate exists, it should control.15 9 The primary foothold for this argu-
ment appears to be identical to the argument forwarded against Article II,
Section 3 self-execution: the terms "clean and healthful" are vague, and
there is no proper guiding principle for a court to define them. For a court
to define them in the absence of legislative guidance clearly abridges the
separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branches due to
the integral legislative command in Section 1(2).
However, the convention records support the contention that Article
IX, Section 1 is self-executing. The idea that Article IX, Section 1(2) could
be interpreted as a grant of exclusive authority over section 1 (1) was raised,
and dismissed, in the Natural Resource committee.' 60 In debating a right-
tion therewith, and sites for reservoirs necessary for collecting and storing water
shall be held to be a public use.
(3) All surface, underground, flood and atmospheric waters within the boundaries
of the state are the property of the state for the use of its people and are subject to
appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law.
(4) The legislature shall provide for the administration, control, and regulation of
water rights and shall establish a system of centralized records, in addition to the
present system of local records.
MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
155. General Agric., 534 P.2d at 862.
156. See MOr. CONsT. art. IX, § 3, set forth supra note 154.
157. See Horwich, supra note 143, at 366.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Proceedings of the Montana Constitutional Convention 3859 (1972).
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to-sue provision, Delegate Cross stated, "Section two does not add anything
positive in terms of environmental protection. The danger in section two is
that it can be construed to exclusively delegate such authority [over the
environment] to the legislature and this would even exclude the courts." '16 1
To forward the opimon Article IX, Section 1 is not self-executing ig-
nores the guiding principles of constitutional interpretation used by the
Montana Supreme Court in deciding MEIC, and further ignores the court's
following statement in General Agriculture:
A provision is self-executing when it can be given effect with-
out the aid of legislation and there is nothing to indicate that
legislation is contemplated in order to render it operative. The
fact that a nght granted by a constitutional provision in ques-
tion may be better or further protected by supplementary legis-
lation does not in itself prevent the provision from being self-
executing 162
This interpretation also demands turning a blind eye to the express
intent of the Constitutional Convention delegates, which make clear the
provision was to be self-executing. Moreover, the argument Article IX,
Section 1 is not self-executing renders the environmental provisions of Arti-
cle IX, Section 1 subject to the whims of the legislature, a situation the
Constitutional Convention delegates specifically sought to avoid.
The MEIC opimon only makes passing reference to Article IX, Section
1(3).163 Unlike Section 1(1), Section 1(3) specifically directs the legislature
to provide remedies that will ensure a clean and healthful environment. Un-
like Sections 1(1) and 1(2), this third subsection imposes a duty to act on
the legislature, and gives that body a clear directive in the same clause.
This is an explicit legislative mandate, and is therefore not self-executing.
It is important to note that MEIC was not a case of "pure" self-execu-
tion as was Stafford. "Pure" self-execution refers to cases where there is a
constitutional mandate requiring legislative action that the legislature has
ignored. MEIC was a case where the legislature had acted. Whether the
environmental provisions are self-executing had little impact on the final
decision of the court. No matter what the self-executing nature of the envi-
ronmental provisions, the implicit reasoning of the decision indicates the
legislature's actions did not satisfy the constitutional commandments con-
tained in the environmental provisions. In the end, the court's neglect of
self-execution is confusing. Clearly, there is authority in both case law and
161. Id. at 3860-61.
162. General Agnc. Corp., 534 P.2d at 862 (citing 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 48) (emphasis
added).
163. The court mentions freedom from "unreasonable degradation" in its conclusion, but not in its
ultimate holding. See MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1249.
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the Constitutional Convention transcnpts to support a finding that the envi-
ronmental provisions of Article II and Article IX are self-executing. While
it is within the discretion of a state's supreme judicial authority to decide
what is relevant to a holding and what is not, the clear implication of sepa-
ration of powers present in MEIC demanded at least an acknowledgment of
the self-execution doctrine.
c. The Importance of the Interrelation and Interdependence of
Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Sections 1(1)
and (3)
As mentioned above, the MEIC court did not discuss Article IX, Sec-
tion 1(3) in any depth. This lack of discussion could leave a reader of the
opinion with the impression that this provision was not particularly relevant
to the court's decision. However, Article IX, Section 1(3) is a one of the
most crucial elements of the opinion. This provision provides the definition
of "clean and healthful," as well as the standard by which degradation is
measured. The language of the Article IX, Section 1(3) specifies that any
degradation of the environmental life support system or natural resources
renders the system or resource unclean and unhealthful. The constitutional
right to a clean and healthful environment and the right to be free from
degradation of the environment were both implicated when SPJV's activi-
ties added arsenic to a body of water in greater concentration than existed
prior to SPJV's activities. 164 The court concluded it was the framers' intent
to construe the environmental rights of Article II, Section 3 and Article IX,
Section 1 as complementary fundamental rights to be applied in tandem.
According Article IX, Section 1 fundamental right status is consistent with
the standard articulated in Butte Community Union and adopted by the court
in MEIC that a right is fundamental if it is a "right 'without which other
constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning.'" 65 Moreo-
ver, and perhaps more importantly, interpreting the environmental provi-
sions to be interrelated and interdependent in this manner is consistent with
the express intent of the framers to provide the strongest environmental
protection possible.166
164. MEIC 988 P.2d at 1249. It is important to note the language of the opinion states "unreasona-
ble degradation." It is clear from the Constitutional Convention transcripts that "unreasonable" modifies
depletion only, and not degradation. Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. II at 555 (1972).
165. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1245 (quoting Butte Commutni' Union, 712 P.2d at 1311 (quoting In re
C.H., 683 P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1984))).
166. See Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV, at 1209 (1972) (comments of Delegate
McNeil).
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2. Judicial Restraint and the Nature of Affirmative Rights
If rights are defined in an affirmative manner, they are notoriously
hard to interpret if it is unclear what common assumptions stand behind
their inclusion in a constitution.167 In Lochner v. New York, the Umted
States Supreme Court examined a New York law that restricted bakery em-
ployees from working more than sixty hours in a week. 168 The majority
struck down the law on grounds that it interfered with "the liberty of person
or the right of free contract," which was protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest's auspices. 169 The Lochner majority felt that
even though the law had been enacted democratically, the state's police
power to safeguard the health of the populace had to have limits.' 70 The
court felt those limits had been reached in Lochner when an individual's
common law freedom to contract was unreasonably restricted.' 7' However,
it is important to note that the Lochner Court did not and could not point to
any statutory or explicit constitutional provision that guarded an individ-
ual's right to freedom of contract. The majority relied on case law that
indicated the freedom to contract was included implicitly in the liberty in-
terest of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 72  In his dissent, Justice Holmes
chastised the majority for their lack of restraint, and accused the majority of
substituting their own economic ideas for those of the New York legisla-
ture173 while ignoring the standard of review that had prevailed to date for
state laws under federal constitutional review 174
Commentators who have examnned affirmative social rights have con-
cluded post-Lochner judicial deference is perfectly appropriate in some
cases, but not all. One commentator argues that state protection of private
property, even when couched in affirmative terms, has been historically in-
terpreted as a prohibition against abridging that right because state protec-
tion of private property is a historic underlying assumption - a baseline
from which courts examine the common law 175 The protection of private
167. See Cass R. Sunstem, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLuM. L. Ray. 873, 888-89 (1987).
168. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 46 (1905).
169. Id at 57.
170. Id. at 58.
171. lid at 57-58.
172. Id at 53. The specific case that stands for the proposition that the freedom to contract can be
found in the underlying pnnciples of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty is Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). In Allgeyer, the court pointed to the inalienable right to pursue an
occupation and held that the freedom to contract was a necessary part of that pursuit. Allgeyer, 165 U.S.
at 589.
173. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 73.
174. Id. at 72-73. Justice Holmes called for judicial action only when statutes are "plainly, palpa-
bly, beyond all question, inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States." Il
175. See Sunstem, supra note 167.
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property is contrasted with the relative unwillingness of courts to intervene
when a state is unwilling to provide welfare services. Because welfare is a
more recent concept and more controversial, it is likely courts feel less sure
about intervening and forcing a state to take action.
In rejecting affirmative rights, most courts rely on the post-Lochner-
era interpretative model, 176 which results in less judicial activity If in cer-
tain cases, like a constitutional right to welfare, the strain on the judiciary
would be enormous and the decisions extremely complex, then judicial neu-
trality and inaction can be appropriate. 177 In other cases, where a model of
interpretation allowing judicial restraint that defines neutrality "in terms of
the perpetuation of current practice," then continued reliance on judicial
neutrality is questionable.
17 8
The right to a clean and healthful environment found in the Article II's
Declaration of Rights is an affirmative right. That is, the text of the Mon-
tana Constitution makes a statement of entitlement, not prohibition. Con-
trast Article II, Section 3 ("All persons are born free and have the right
to a clean and healthful environment.") with Article II, Section 7 ("No law
shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech or expression."). The latter
is clearly a prohibition against any legislative or administrative action,
while the former is somewhat vague. It seems to guarantee a clean and
healthful environment, but without a specific context. By definition, af-
firmative rights do not have defined limits. Without reference to secondary
materials, the text of the provision offers no definition for exactly what
might be included in that right, nor does it offer much guidance to the gov-
ernment as to what it is empowered to do to protect or abridge the right.
Due to this lack of guidance, issues of judicial deference and judicial re-
straint arise as disputes involving affirmative rights find their way into a
courtroom. Much like the questions regarding provisions that may or may
not be self-executing, defining affirmative rights usually involves balancing
separation of powers among the three branches of government. Each
branch of the government has their own version of how the rights should be
interpreted and, in the end, it is the judiciary that must decide which version
will carry the day
One of the primary criticisms leveled at the MEIC decision is that the
176. Id. The Lochner model is best understood in a historical sense by the words of Justice Black,
"The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner and like case - that due process authorizes courts to hold laws
unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely - has long been discarded. We
have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and
economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws." Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
177. Sunstem, supra note 167, at 915-16.
178. Id. at 918-19.
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court engaged in Lochnerization179 m that it created a new substantive right
out of thin air and overruled the Degradation Waiver because it disagreed
with the State's decision to allow SPJV to mine gold. Critics of the court's
holdings in MEIC believe the court gave too much force to a previously un-
interpreted constitutional right and insufficient deference to the legislature's
efforts at crafting natural resource policy
This criticism is unfounded. Like the freedom to contract, the Umted
States Supreme Court found m the underlying principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment certain common law principles which apply to environmental
pollution. This allows the affirmative right to a clean and healthful environ-
ment to be interpreted with ease, because the common assumptions standing
behind its inclusion in the constitution are clear. Specifically, the common
law doctrine of public nuisance' 80 is relevant in this context, as it has pro-
vided the foundation for many of the 20th century's environmental laws.'
8 1
In MEIC, the environmental Groups alleged the discharge of arsemc into
the rivers threatened their recreation activities and sources of drinking
water. More recent interpretations of public nuisance have sounded a theme
that strikes close to what the environmental groups m MEIC alleged. "A
public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public."' 2 In addition to the issue of common assumptions, inter-
pretation of the affirmative "clean and healthful" right is also clarified by
the clear intent of the framers to provide the strongest environmental pro-
tections possible and allow no environmental degradation.
Justice Trieweiler placed the MEIC opinion within a framework that is
conservative by post-Lochner standards in its application of the environ-
mental provisions found in Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1.
First, the decision abides by the well-defined constitutional mandate for a
separation of powers.' 83 The MEIC holding might be read to implicate that
179. "Lochnenze - to examine and strike down economic legislation under the guise of enforcing
the Due Process clause " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 951 (7th ed. 1999). Also important to note is
that the Lochner decision itself was struck down 32 years later by West Coast Hotels v. Parrsh, 300
U.S. 379 (1937). In West Coast Hotels, the majority noted the lack of express Constitutional protection
for the freedom to contract. West Coast Hotels, 300 U.S. at 391. According to Chief Justice Hughes,
because the freedom to contract was not express and instead found in the shadow of another provision,
the natural logical step is to recogmze that the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncon-
trollable liberty. Id.
180. "Public nuisances were common law crimes that involved offenses against public property or
that endangered the health or property of large numbers of people." ROBERT V PERcIVAL ET AL.,
ENvmomAEN,  RECULATION 73 (2d ed.1996).
181. Id. at 71.
182. RE TATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1995).
183. Article lIl, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution provides:
The power of the government of this state is divided into three distinct branches -
legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or person charged with the exercise
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separation because the court seems to be substituting its own opinion for
that of the legislature and the administrative agency However, because the
court limits its holding to the arbitrary exclusion of degradation review for
the well tests based on the Degradation Review Waiver, 84 it does not tread
squarely on legislative or administrative turf. Faced with two conflicting
legal provisions and the alleged infnngement of fundamental constitutional
rights, the court chose to invoke its powers of review Additionally, in its
final disposition of the case, the court makes clear its willingness to uphold
the legislature's view that the Nondegradation Policy was a reasonable in-
terpretation of the Montana constitutional provisions. 85
Second, rather than substitute the court's opinion as to what the rights
mean, the members of the court deferred to the framers of the constitution.
The lengthy and frequent citations to the records of the Constitutional Con-
vention illustrate this point. The holding in MEIC is clearly derived from
the intent of the Constitutional Convention delegates and not the court's
own ideology In this sense, the MEIC holding is an example of judicial
restraint, far from an example of Lochnerizing.
Like the issue of self-execution, the court did not discuss the issue of
affirmative rights. One possible reason mght be the strong likelihood that
the district court's decision on a compelling state interest would be ap-
pealed again. A second appeal involving the issue of compelling state inter-
est would have provided an opportunity to fully discuss the nature of the
rights in question with a more complete factual background. Despite this
missed opportunity, the opinion still develops a model for how the constitu-
tional rights will be interpreted after MEIC. The intent of the framers will
be the predominant factor in cases of constitutional construciton, and it
seems unlikely the court will freely interject its own opinions as to the sub-
stance of constitutional provisions.
C. Challenging a Constitutional Right - The Facial vs.
"As-applied" Distinction
The Groups presented their case as an "as-applied" legal challenge,' 86
and both the district court and the Montana Supreme Court addressed it as
of power properly belonging to one branch shall exercise any power properly
belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed
or permitted.
184. The court also did not address the issue of how Article IX, Section 3 is to be read. This
provision states that the legislature shall protect the environment from "unreasonable depletion and
degradation." MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3. It seems clear from the court's later analysis that they believe
the term unreasonable modifies only depletion, but they do not say so explicitly. See MEIC, 988 P.2d at
1231.
185. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1249.
186. An as-applied challenge is a "claim that a statute is unconstitutional on the facts of a particu-
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such. The majority opimon explicitly states its ruling in as-applied ternu-
nology- "Our holding is limited to § 75-5-317(2)0), MCA (1995), as ap-
plied to the facts in tins case. We have not been asked to and do not hold
that this section facially implicates constitutional rights." 187
However, m the same paragraph, the majority said it is the "arbitrary"
exclusion of well tests from the degradation review required by
Nondegradation Policy that violated the constitution's environmental provi-
sions. This language implies the court found the degradation exemption of
Degradation Review Waiver facially mvalid.188 Put another way, it was not
the specific activities of SPJV the court found unconstitutional. Rather, it
was the legislative enactment of the degradation review waivers that was
unconstitutional because those waivers arbitrarily excluded certain activi-
ties. This contradiction is further evidenced by the remand instructions,
which order the district court to determine if a compelling state interest
justified the enactment of the Degradation Review Waiver. 189 If the
Groups' challenge and the court's analysis were truly as-applied, the in-
quiry should focus on the permit issued to SPJV by the Agency, and not on
the statute's enactment. Unless the legislature enacted the degradation ex-
emption specifically for SPJV, however, under the court's reasoning it
would follow that the statute would always be unconstitutional.
Justice Leaphart discussed the contradiction between the court's char-
actenzation of the case as an "as applied" challenge and the facial challenge
language of the holding in Ins concurrence, and decided the court struck
down the law as facially unconstitutional whether acknowledged as such or
not. This contradiction leaves a burning question unanswered. Was it the
exemption statute itself, or the application of the statute by the Agency to
SPJV's activities that was to be strictly scrutinized by the district court on
remand?
lar case or to a particular party." BLACK'S LAW DicnoNARY 223 (7th ed. 1999). This is to be differenti-
ated from a facial challenge, which claims that a statute always operates unconstitutionally. See d.
187. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1249.
188. The groups stated they were bringing an "as-applied" challenge, even though the language
used in the complaint specifically implicated a facial challenge. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1237 ("Plaintiffs
alleged that to the extent § 75-5-317(2)(j), MCA (1995) allows discharges of water from watering
well or monitoring well tests, which degrade high quality waters without review pursuant to Montana's
nondegradation policy found at § 75-5-303, that statute is void for a violation of Article IX, Section 1(1)
and (3) of the Montana Constitution."). Facial language is also used later in the opinion: "Plaintiffs
contend the provisions of the [well test degradation waiver] amendment must be strictly scrutinized
for not only a compelling state interest, but also to assure that the amendment is closely tailored to
effectuate the government's interest by the least onerous path available. " Id. at 1241. The accept-
ance of the Groups' characterization of the nature of the challenge is troubling because it indicates the
majority neglected to analyze the substance of the Groups' complaint.
189. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1249.
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D Compelling State Interest For Private Action
The Court's ultimate holding is unusual because it concluded private
actions are also included under the umbrella of strict scrutiny 190 This part
of the holding seems to rely on the language of Article IX, Section 1, which
includes a mandate for both the state and "each person" to maintain and
improve the environment.19' The court offers no guidance on how to apply
the strict scrutiny standard of "compelling state interest" to a private action.
The issue of private action was not before MEIC court, and it is best to
consider the private action language dictum. However, the court's recent
ruling in Cape-France Enterprises v Estate of Peed 92 makes it clear the
190. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1246. As stated previously, strict scrutiny requires a narrowly tailored
compelling state interest in order to justify an infringement of a fundamental right. Montana v. Pastos,
887 P.2d 199 (1994). Missing from the discussion in Pastos is any mention of expressio unus est
exclusto alterus, a doctrine of textual iiterpretation which assumes that a term specifically mentioned in
one clause and not in others is presumed to be left out by design.
Of the 35 rights enumerated in Article II of the Montana Constitution and declared fundamental by
the court in In re C.H., 683 P.2d 931, 940 (1984), the only provision that mentions the standard of
compelling state interest is Section 10: "Right of privacy. The right of individual privacy is essential to
the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest." MorTr. CONST. art. II, § 10. By assigning the same level of review to all the rights in Article
II despite one section specifically having the standard mentioned in its text, the court has created a
redundancy which to date it has not addressed.
191. "Seems" is the key word here. With respect to private action the majority s opinion is piob-
lematic at best. The first two pages or so of the "Constitutional Analysis" section of the opinion are
devoted to a history of the court's case law on strict scrutiny. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1244-46. Paragraph 64
begins with a statement indicating the court will apply strict scrutiny to Article IX, Section I because of
its relation to Article II, Section 3. Id. at 1246. Then, for the first time, the court brings up private
action: "However, we conclude that the right to a clean and healthful environment guaranteed by Article
II, Section 3, and those provided for in Article IX, Section 1 were intended by the constitution's framers
to be interrelated and interdependent and that state or private action which implicates either, must be
scrutinized consistently." Id.
The court then announces strict scrutiny will apply to both state and private action. Id. Nowhere in
the opinion was the issue of private action raised or discussed before this point. The briefs before the
court were void of any mention of private action. The court offers no reason for including private action
and no support for its inclusion that it should be analyzed in the same light as state action. The lone
possible source for this conclusion is a statement of Delegate McNeil that is cited later in the opinion.
See id. at 1247 However, Delegate McNeil speaks only to private property, not private action. i.
192. 29 P.3d 1011 (Mont. 2001). In Cape-France, the court was faced with a land purchase con-
tract between two private parties that dealt with privately-owned land. A condition of the deal was the
ability to subdivide the property post-sale. However, the ability to subdivide was clouded because of
possible groundwater contamination that only became evident during the process. The deal was further
complicated because the only way to determine whether the land was contaminated would have required
the seller to drill a test well, which in turn might have further compounded any existing groundwater
contamination and exposed seller to liability for the clean-up. The court held that the seller could be
released from the contractual obligations on grounds of impossibility or impractability. In the alterna-
tive, the court then held that the protections in Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1 would not
have allowed a court to mandate performance of the contract because to do so would have potentially
caused "significant degradation of uncontaminated aquifers" and posed "serious public health risks."
Cape-France, 29 P.3d at 1017. Additionally, the court added "the law's interest in enforcing a contract
for a land sale between two private parties" fell short of the compelling state interest needed to sur ive
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court is interested in expanding MEIC's approach to private action.
E. MEIC As A Predictive Model
The Montana Supreme Court has been presented with only two oppor-
tunities to consider these provisions, but has not rendered a decision as of
the writing of this note m one case 19 3 and only cursorily addressed the issue
of private action m dictum in Cape-France. Despite the absence of subse-
quent interpretation, several aspects of the opimon provide useful guidance.
The most important aspect is the declaration that the right to a clean
and healthful environment is a fundamental right. Because that right is fun-
damental, any state action implicating the right is subject to strict scrutiny
Strict scrutiny is the highest level of judicial scrutiny, and one that is rarely
satisfied. State action implicating a fundamental right must advance a com-
pelling state interest, and must be tailored as narrowly as possible to avoid
interference with the right. It is clear from the factual background and the
nature of the court's holdings that minimal levels of degradation are neces-
sary to implicate constitutional environmental rights and trigger strict scru-
tiny of the state action permitting the degradation.
Additionally, the relaxed standing requirements adopted by the court
allow easier access to the courts, particularly for interest groups who allege
an injury particular to them, but not necessarily exclusive to them. It is
apparent from the court's reasoning that clear and supportable allegations of
economic injury will satisfy the first prong of the standing test used by the
MEIC court. It is less clear whether allegations based solely on the envi-
ronmental rights contained in Article II, section 3 and Article IX, section 1
will support standing. However, the Groups in MEIC alleged injury to
those rights, and the court considered their claim. Justice Treiweiler took
particular care to emphasize that the environmental provisions are "both
anticipatory and preventative."' 194 Because of this anticipatory nature, it ap-
pears the court will allow mere allegations of infringement of environmen-
tal rights to satisfy the first prong of the standing test. However, until
further decisions address this issue, prudent practitioners should endeavor
to make supportable allegations of economic injury if possible.
The language implying a constitutional right of action against non-
state actors is presently unworkable as dictum unsupported by any analysis,
reasoning, or prior precedent in Montana constitutional jurisprudence. The
strict scrutiny. Idl Now-Chief Justice Gray "strenuously dissented" citing both the sua sponte nature of
the majority's endeavor and the unnecessary nature of involang the constitutional provisions when the
majority's ruling hinged on basic contract law principles. Id at 1025.
193. Respondent's Brief at 18-19, Montana v. Boyer, No. 00-183 (2001).
194. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1249.
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private action statement is somewhat troubling. Application of the strict
scrutiny standard to private actions which implicate the fundamental right
to a clean and healthful environment creates the potential for conflict with
other fundamental rights. The clause of the constitution that grants the right
to a clean and healthful environment also grants the right to acquire, pos-
sess, and protect property 195 As construed in MEIC, the right to a clean
and healthful environment could conflict with the right to private property
A homeowner seeking to build an addition provides a good illustration of
the potential conflict. The construction may create minor runoff and affect
a nearby creek. In Montana building construction requires a permit and city
approval of the building plan.196 Normally, permits and licenses are re-
quired to head off nuisance litigation 197 and should be granted by the per-
mitting agency, within the bounds of the agency's reasonable discretion.' 98
One question that remains to be answered is whether MEIC now requires
the existence of a compelling state interest for a state agency to grant a
simple building permit when environmental quality may be impacted by the
construction. 199
However, four of seven Justices joined in the private action holding.
The three concurrng justices who addressed the private action issue did not
dismiss private action as unworkable, but rather dismissed private action as
an issue not before the MEIC court, and one better addressed "another
day "200 This perhaps indicates a willingness to entertain future challenges
to private action based on the environmental provisions. In a recent oral
argument before the Montana Supreme Court, Assistant Attorney General
Mark Mattioli responded affirmatively to Justices Treiweiler and Nelson's
inquiry as to whether the State believed Article IX, Section l(1) applied to
private action.20' Given the apparent attitude of the court, a clear standard
to scrutinize private action implicating the environmental provisions may be
forthcoming.
Perhaps the most unique aspect of the decision is the court's holding
that Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1 are interrelated and inter-
dependent provisions to be scrutinized consistently It appears from the fi-
195. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
196. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-6-106 (1999).
197. 53 C.J.S. Licenses § 3 (1987).
198. Id. at § 38.
199. Justice Rice echoed these same concerns in his concurring opinion in Cape-France. See
Cape-France, 29 P.3d at 1022. (Rice, J., concumng). However, storm water runoff associated with
construction activity is now regulated under the MPDES general permit. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 75-5-
401 (c).
200. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1250 (Leaphart, J., concumng).
201. Assistant Attorney General Mark Mattioli, Oral Argument, Montana Supreme Court (Apr. 20,
2001), Montana v. Boyer No. 00-183 (2001).
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nal outcome of the case that Article IX, Section 1 provides the definition
and standard for "clean and healthful" as well as "degradation." At the
least, minimal degradation may be constitutionally impernssible. This
stringent standard is consistent with the intent behind the environmental
provisions to provide the strongest protection possible.
V DIsPOSITION
The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to strictly
scrutimze whether the degradation exemption for water well tests was justi-
fied by a compelling state interest under the Wadsworth criteria. 2  As
mentioned previously the remand instructions were unclear, and potentially
problematic. The district court, however, never had a chance determine the
meaning of the remand instructions. After the decision was issued on Octo-
ber 20, 1999, the case was mooted by political action. On November 3,
1998, Montana voters passed Initiative 137 ("1-137"), which banned the
only feasible mining method for the SPJV project.2 ' 3 On remand, the dis-
tnct court ruled that because the only feasible method of operating the
SPJV McDonald Gold Mine was banned, the passage of 1-137 rendered the
issue of the well tests moot.2" In its dismissal order the district court also
noted that although SPJV filed suit to have 1-137 overturned, the well tests
were deemed complete by SPJV 205 The court held the passage of the miti-
ative, combined with SPJV's admission that well tests would not be re-
peated under any circumstances, rendered the compelling state interest anal-
ysis unnecessary 206
SPJV subsequently filed suit challenging the constitutionality of 1-137,
and in the alternative, asserting a takings claim against the state as a result
of 1-137 207 Both actions are still pending as of the date of publication of
this note.
202. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1249.
203. Now codified, the initiative reads:
(1) Open-pit mining for gold or silver using heap leaching or vat leaching with
cyanide ore-processing reagents is prohibited except as described in subsection
(2).
(2) A mine described m this section operating on November 3, 1998, may con-
tinue operating under its existing operating permit or any amended permit that is
necessary for the continued operation of the mine.
MoNT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-390 (1999)(emphasis added).
204. Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, No. BDV 95-1184, 2000 MontLaw 1432
(1 Jud. Dist.)(2000).
205. Id
206. Id
207. See Seven-Up Pete Venture v. State of Montana, No. BDV 2000-250, 2000 MontLaw 2898
(1' Jud. Dist.)(2000).
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The Montana legislature also responded to the MEIC decision. During
the 2001 legislative session, two bills were introduced that took direct aim
at the court's ruling. Ultimately tabled in the Natural Resources Committee
by one vote, Senate Bill 463 proposed to add a second clause to Article II,
Section 3, that would have allowed the legislature to "balance" the inaliena-
ble rights enumerated in the current version of the constitution.20 8 House
Bill 200, also tabled in committee, proposed to allow the legislature to over-
rule decisions of the Montana Supreme Court on state constitutional is-
sues.2 9 The legislature's response to the MEIC opinion reinforces the be-
lief that the effect of MEIC will be to give environmental groups a powerful
tool to challenge polluting activities.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court's decision in MEIC is the first decision
to interpret and apply the state constitution's environmental provisions. Al-
though abbreviated reasoning and analysis tend to undercut its precedential
value, at a minimum MEIC illuminates some important points. First, inter-
est groups apparently have standing to sue based on an alleged violation of
constitutional environmental rights. Second, the rights recognized in Arti-
cle II, Section 3, and Article IX, Sections 1(1) and 1(3) are fundamental
interdependent rights to be construed consistently Finally, the court will
look to the framers' intent in future cases requiring construction of constitu-
tional provisions. Although the opinion is not as definitive as one might
hope, it is likely the court will have the opportunity to revisit its holdings in
the near future.
208. S.B. 463, 2001 Leg. Session (Mont. 2001), available at http://Iaws.leg.state.mt.us:8C00/
lawso/plsql/LAW0200W$.startup. Specifically, the proposed amendment to the constitution would
have read: "It is the legislature, which in fulfilling its responsibilities, may balance these rights, and the
balance determined by the legislature shall be valid unless determined to be unreasonable." Id., see also
Defining clean MissouLiAN, Feb. 15, 2001, at Al.
209. H.B. 200, 2001 Leg. Session (Mont. 2001), available at http://laws.leg.state.mt.us:8000/
lawso/plsql/LAW0200W$.startup; see also Other Bills Try to Limit Supreme Court, THE MONTANA
LAWYER, Jan. 2001, at 6.
